

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 14, 2006

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending July 14, 2006

Mr. Owen was out of the office this week. Staff member Ernie Elliott was at Oak Ridge this week to perform site representative duties.

A. Criticality Safety. The site rep. and staff performed a walkdown of the Warehouse this week to review implementation of criticality safety controls. During the walkdown, the staff requested additional information on several criticality safety deficiency postings observed in the facility. Subsequent review by facility personnel determined that these deficiencies had been resolved but the postings were not removed. In addition, the facility status board referenced an outdated criticality safety deficiency. The site rep. and staff discussed these observations with YSO and BWXT management. Based on these observations, BWXT noted that they plan to review both the procedures and site-wide facility implementation of criticality safety deficiencies and other communications from criticality safety. In particular, this review will focus on the process for configuration control of these items at the facility level.

The staff and site rep. also reviewed the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) evaluation and controls for the casting operations in the Enriched Uranium Operations Building. One of the controls did not appear to be adequately supported by the analysis in the NCS evaluation. This observation was discussed with the appropriate NCS personnel.

B. ORNL Tank W-1A Soil Sampling. As a part of the soil characterization activity around ORNL Tank W-1A, Bechtel Jacobs Company (BJC) plans to extract as many as 200 soil samples during three phases. BJC is nearing the completion of the first phase of sampling that includes 36 locations around the tank. Next week, BJC will evaluate the data from the first phase and identify the specific locations for additional characterization as a part of the second phase. The final phase includes sampling of soil very close to the tank that is expected to contain the highest contamination levels. To date, the contamination levels are consistent with BJC expectations; however, some of the samples near the excavation boundary may indicate the need to perform surveys in the previously excavated area.

C. Quality Evaluation Building. As a part of material consolidation and reduction of the security footprint at Y-12, BWXT began plans for relocation of Quality Evaluation (QE) activities to the Assembly/Disassembly Building and removal of nuclear material from the Quality Evaluation Building in late-2004. As noted last week, activities to perform QE in the relocated linear glovebox are on-going. BWXT had been using the octagonal glovebox, which is still located in the Quality Evaluation Building, for QE activities. Earlier this year, BWXT completed the needed QE activities and discontinued use of the octagonal glovebox. This week, BWXT finished removing nuclear material from the Quality Evaluation Building. Until the linear glovebox is operational, BWXT will maintain the octagonal glovebox such that any emergent QE activities could be performed. Planning for the relocation of the octagonal glovebox to the Assembly/Disassembly Building are in process. Relocation and startup activities for this glovebox will occur in 2007.